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phylactic as well as the curative measures of the judicial process
are needed.
There is good reason for the constitutional requirement of
"probable cause" for search and seizure by law enforcement officials.
"Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow
less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the
officer's whim or caprice." 44

This thought must be kept in mind

in any attempt to balance our society's interest in law enforcement
against its constitutional guaranty of privacy. It is submitted that
the reasonableness of the frisk on "reasonable suspicion," when seen
in the light of the constitutional policy espoused in Mapp, depends
on its being distinguishable from a search based on "probable cause."
The decision of the majority in the instant case has made that
distinction more apparent than real. Initially, as Judge Van Voorhis
pointed out, the frisk rests on uncertain ground. If we accept it
at all, we accept it as an exception to traditional "probable cause"
requirements in order that the police may protect their own lives.
But as an exception it must be strictly circumscribed. The confiscation provision of the "stop and frisk" statute, as interpreted
by the Court in Peters and Sibron, authorizes conduct clearly
beyond that which was approved in People v. Rivera. It is suggested that this interpretation is not likely to withstand the test of
constitutional reasonableness.45 In fact, to allow such confiscation,
and to admit such evidence is to circumvent the Mapp exclusionary
rule, thereby undermining the constitutional guarantees of the
fourth amendment.

A
CRIMINAL LAWUSE OF INCRIMINATING CONFESSION OF
CODEFENDANT IN JOINT TRIAL HELD GROUND FOR REVERSAL AS AN
ABUSE OF TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION AND VIOLATION OF NONCONFESSOR'S CONFRONTATION RIGHT. - At a joint trial, a signed,
post-arraignment confession of one defendant was admitted as corroborative evidence of a codefendant's testimony, despite non-confessing defendants' objections and motions for severance.
The
names of the non-confessing defendants had been deleted from the
confession, and the jury was emphatically instructed, before and
after its admission, that the confession was admissible only against
the confessor. In reversing the convictions of the non-confessing
defendants, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
44 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). (Emphasis added.)
45 See 50 CoRni.L L.Q. 529 (1964), for a discussion which also suggests
that the limitations on "stop and frisk" must be drawn at the Rivera holding.
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held, that because of the complexity of the case, the importance of the confession to the government's case, and
the "real doubt" that at least some jurors failed to follow
the trial court's instructions regarding the limited applicability
of the confession, its admission was prejudicial error requiring reversal and a new trial. United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206
(2d Cir. 1966).
When two or more defendants are jointly indicted and tried,
the paramount problem facing the trial court is that of weighing
the desire to effectively punish the antisocial behavior of the alleged
partners in crime against the individual defendant's right to every
procedural safeguard.' Since joint trials are peculiar to our jurisprudential tradition, they demand every legal protection "to individualize each defendant in his relation to the mass." 2 In order to
effectively provide such protection to joint defendants in federal
trials, Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows
separate trials, severance, or any other just relief when it is shown
that a codefendant is prejudiced. 3 However, this rule is not applicable if the defect comes within the purview of the harmless
error rule, which disregards "any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights. ....
The purpose of the harmless error rule has been stated to be
the prevention of reversals for technical errors which do not seriously jeopardize the rights of the defendant.5 In Kotteakos v. United
States, 6 the United States Supreme Court set forth the test to be
utilized by the lower courts when considering the possible applicability
of the harmless error rule.
.4

The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support
the result, apart from the phase affected by the error. It is, rather ...
whether the error itself had substantial influence.
If so, or if one is
7
left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.
'In United States v. Liss, 137 F.2d 995 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
773 (1943), the dissent noted that "the potential danger of injustice involved
in all conspiracy actions . . . [demands that] they be conducted with exceptional fairness. 'Expedition' and 'efficiency' . . . ought not be purchased at
the expense of justice." Id. at 1004. For special trial procedures employed
at joint trials see O'Dougherty, Prosecution and Defense under Compiracy
Indictments, 9 BROOKLYN L. REv. 263 (1940).
2 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 773 (1946).
3 "If it appears that a defendant . . . is prejudiced by a joinder of
offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for
trial together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts,
grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice
requires."
FEa. R. CRIm. P. 14.
4
FFD. R. Ci im. P. 52(a).
SSupra note 2, at 759 nAl.
6328 U.S. 750 (1946).
Id. at 764-65.
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Therefore, the question presented in a joint trial where there is an
allegation of prejudice is whether the prejudice claimed had "substantial influence" so as to warrant the application of rule 14 allow"ing severance, or whether it is merely a technical error to be
ignored pursuant to rule 52(a).
In the conspiracy area, courts have found prejudicial error
present in instances where there is a discrepancy in the number of
conspiracies charged ;8 upon mention of a defendant's prior criminal
record; 9 when unsworn, out-of-court statements of a non-defendant
are admitted;1O and where a tape recording of a conversation implicating all defendants was admitted without any warning to the jury
that the tape was evidence of only the speaker's guilt. 1
A more frequently alleged form of prejudice is the harm to a
defendant caused by the admission of a codefendant's confession or
statement which incriminates the non-confessing defendants. 12
When a continuing conspiracy is in progress, any declaration made
by a conspirator to a third party is deemed, because of the "partnership-agency" relationship of the conspirators, to have been
spoken in furtherance of the conspiracy and, hence, admissible in
evidence against all the defendants.'"
However, when the conspiracy has realized its objective, or when the purpose of the conspiracy has been abandoned, this partnership-agency relationship
ceases.' 4 At this time, therefore, any declaration or admission is a
frustration of the conspiratorial plan and admissible only as evidence
against the declarant. 15
The United States Supreme Court, in Blumenthal v. United
States,'16 was confronted with the issue of whether, on a conspiracy
indictment naming five defendants, admissions by two defendants
to tax officials after the conspiracy ceased were properly admitted
at the joint trial. The Court found that any doubt as to the jury's
8 Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211 (1946) (forty conspiracies were
charged, but only one was proven). But see United States v. Elgisser, 334
F.2d 103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 881 (1964).
9 Sumrall v. United States, 360 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1966); United States
v. Myers, 311 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied sub nor. Rucker v.
Myers, Warden, 374 U.S. 844 (1963); United States v. Rinaldi, 301 F.2d
576 (2d Cir. 1962).
10 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949).
11 United States v. Cianchetti, 315 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1963).
12 See Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 555 (1947).
'3 United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 460 (1827) (indictment
for fitting out ship for use in Negro slave trade). For elaboration on the
agency relationship aspect, see 3 WIGMoaa, EVIDENCE § 1079 (3d ed. 1940).
14 Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 217 (1946); Brown v. United

States, 150 U.S. 93, 98 (1893) ; Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 308-09
(1892). See also 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EviDENcE § 722. (11th ed. 1935).
15 Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539 (1947). See also Baker v.
United States, 329 F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1964).
16 332 U.S. 539 (1947).
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use of the confessions against non-confessing defendants would be
ground for reversal under rule 14. Nevertheless, it was held that
the trial court's instruction that the confessions were to be used
solely against the declarants left "no room for doubt that the admissions were adequately excluded. .

.."17

The Bhnenthal rule, that harm to a defendant in admitting a
codefendant's confession cannot be the basis for reversal if there
are limiting instructions to the jury, seems to have been modified in
Delli Paoli v. United States."" There, in a trial of five defendants
for conspiring to deal unlawfully in alcohol, no motion for severance
was made, and the jury was instructed that the confession, while
naming all defendants, was evidence of guilt only against the confessor. In the circuit court,19 Judge Learned Hand found that any
attempt to delete names would have been a futile gesture because
of other substantial evidence of guilt, and the admission was, thus,
harmless error. He noted, additionally,, that the dilemma of admitting a confession against the declarant, while protecting the
rights of his codefendants, was to be solved by an exercise of discretion by the trial court.20 Judge Frank, dissenting, viewed the
confession as vital supportive evidence against the non-confessors,
and noted that the posed dilemma could be solved in three ways:
the court could either delete all references to the other defendants;
refuse the admission of the confession at the joint trial; or sever
the trial of the non-confessing defendants sua sponte.2 '
On review, the Supreme Court rejected the dissent's three-part
rule regarding admissibility, and agreed with the majority that a
severance because of the admission of a codefendant's confession
was within the discretion of the trial court. The Court followed
the Blzmenthal rule in the main, but substituted a dual test in place
of the single criterion of Blumenthal. A clear instruction to the
jury that the confession was to be applied only against the confessor
was held vital in Delli Paoli as it was in Blumenthal. Additionally,
however, it was held that clear instructions to the jury must be
made under circumstances where it is reasonably possible for the
jury to follow them.22 In the circumstances of the case, the Court
found a presumption that the jury complied with the instructions
for five reasons: (1) the conspiracy was simple, i.e., each defendant's role was easily understood; (2) the confession merely corroborated what the government had already established; (3) the
rights of each defendant were protected by counsel at the trial and
1"Id. at 551-52.
is352 U.S. 232 (1957).
'9 United States v. Delli Paoli, 229 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1956).
20
21
22

Id. at 321.
Id. at 324.
Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
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no motion for severance was made; (4) the rights of each defendant were emphasized at trial; and, (5) there was no evidence of
jury confusion. 2 3 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, reasoned
that the intrinsically ineffective admonition prohibiting use of the
confession against a non-confessing but joint defendant was empty
verbiage and that the knowledge of the confession could not be
wiped from the minds of the jurors.24 The government's "windfall"
of influencing the jury definitely, although indirectly, was prejudicial 2error
and, in the dissent's opinion, reparable only by separate
5
trials.
Subsequently, in Schaffer v. United States, 26 the Supreme
Court, in dictum, reasoned that the trial court is under a continuing
duty to grant severance where prejudice is shown. Since the Court
found no error in the case before it, it did not discuss the nature
of the harmless error rule.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied the approach used in Delli Paoli and Schaffer when a codefendant's confession was used at a trial.2 7 In United States v. Caron,"' the
defendants made a timely motion for severance whereas Delli Paoli
had not. The circuit court of appeals held, nevertheless, that since
the trial judge had admonished the jury fifteen times as to the
limited use of the confession, and since there was extensive support
of the government's case by witnesses not party to the conspiracy,
the trial judge had not abused his discretion in denying the severance motion. Similarly, any error in allowing a codefendant's statement made in a prior civil court action was considered non-prejudicial to the non-confessing defendant in United States v. Castellana,29 since the evidence of guilt therein was overwhelming.
The court emphasized that there was not even a reasonable possibility that the confession added to the conviction. 0 Again, in
United States v. Casalinuovo,31 the second circuit held that where
a post-arraignment confession was not objected to by the named,
non-confessing defendant, and no motion for mistrial was made, the
conviction must be affirmed. The court held, additionally, that the
issue was not whether the trial court should have deleted the names
231d. at 241.
24

1d. at 247 (dissenting opinion).
25 Id. at 248 (dissenting opinion).
26362 U.S. 511 (1960).
27 See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1965) ; United
States v. Brown, 335 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Houlihan,
332 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 828 (1964); United States v.
Manfredi, 275 F.2d 588 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 828 (1960).
28266 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1959).
29349 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 928 (1966).
so Id. at 276.
31350 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1965).
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of the codefendants, but whether there was sufficient additional
evidence32 to sustain the convictions if the confession were disregarded.
In other circuits, however, neither the sufficiency of the other
evidence against the non-confessing defendant, nor the presumption
that the jury will follow the trial court's instructions to compartmentalize the evidence against each defendant, have been considered
an effective means of safeguarding an incriminated defendant's right
to a fair trial. In Oliver v. United States,33 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated that the court could not be sure that
the prejudice caused by reference to non-confessing defendants in
a codefendant's confession was remedied by instructions to the jury.
The court looked instead to the form of the confession, and noted
that deletion of the non-confessing defendants' names would leave
the confession just as effective against the confessor, and simultaneously respect the codefendant's constitutional rights.
Courts find themselves in a more difficult situation, however,
when references in a confession to non-confessing codefendants are
so grammatically intertwined with the declarant's own admission
of guilt as to destroy its effectiveness in the declarant's own case.
In such a situation, it has been held that a substitution of blank
spaces for the other defendant's names will not afford protection.
In Jones v. United States,3 4 a confession made without aid of counsel and during an unreasonable delay in arraignment was held
inadmissible against the confessor as well as the codefendants. The
prosecution had substituted blanks for non-confessing defendants'
names, and the jury was instructed as to the limited applicability of
such evidence. However, other evidence made it obvious that the
omitted names were those of the codefendants. The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals did not apply the Delli Paoli presumption that the jury can dismiss an incriminating confession from
their minds when considering the guilt of a codefendant. The court
limited the Delli Paoli decision to its facts, finding it applicable
only in those cases where the record contained a confession admissible against its maker, where deletion of the codefendants' names
was impractical, where other evidence against a codefendant was
sufficient to sustain a conviction, and where admonitions to the jury
as to its limited applicability were clearly and consistently given.35
In Barton. v. United States,.3 a confession legally admitted
against its maker incriminated a codefendant in the conspiracy.
The fifth circuit was loathe to review the evidence against the
at 212.
33 335 F.2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
34342 F.2d 863 (D.C Cir. 1964).
35M. at 867.

32Id.

30263 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1959).
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codefendant apart from the confession and considered such scrutiny
a substitution of the appellate court for the jury.37 The court,
noting that the trial court's instructions to the jury were the only
attempt at protecting the codefendant, held that protection was
lacking since the discipline required of the jurors in compartmentalizing the evidence was highly improbable. The court declared
that if the limiting instructions were not actually effective, then the
codefendant had been deprived of his3 8 constitutional right of confrontation under the sixth amendment.
Since the sixth amendment right to confrontation includes the
right of a defendant to cross-examine his accuser,3 9 constitutional
problems are created by attempting to compartmentalize confessions.
Thus, if the jury fails to comply with instructions compelling them
to disregard the confession as it applies to a non-confessing codefendant, that codefendant will, in effect, be deprived of his right
to cross-examine since he will not have had the opportunity to
challenge the confession during the course of the trial.
The jury's role in evaluating confessions as evidence also gives
rise to additional problems within the realm of compartmentalization. In Jackson v. Denno,4 0 the Supreme Court reviewed the New
York procedure which allowed submission of a confession to the
jury with instructions to disregard such if it was later found to
be involuntary and, thus, inadmissible. The Court found substantial
error in this procedure, since the jury could not be expected to
determine the voluntariness of the confession without simultaneously
judging the truthfulness of the statement. It was found that the
danger of the jury settling doubts regarding other evidence by
using the "inadmissible" confession as support was error too great
to be ignored. 41 As support for this proposition, the Jackson Court
relied on Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Delli Paoli which
considered the admission of a codefendant's confession as a windfall
to the government and considered
any admonition to disregard such
42
as intrinsically ineffective.
In the instant case, United States v. Bozza,4 3
six
defendants were convicted of charges, including conspiracy,
relating to seven burglaries.
Due to the fact that multiple
conspiracies were alleged against multiple defendants, the jury was
provided with a "short scorecard" to alleviate any confusion which
might have ensued.
37

Id. at 898.

8 Ibid.

39

Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).

40 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
41 Id. at 388.
42 Supra note 22, at 247 (dissenting opinion).
43 365 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1966).
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One of the defendants, arrested during the pendency of the
alleged conspiracies, became a government informer and thereafter
gathered information for use at trial. His testimony comprised the
bulk of the government's case.
Subsequently, however, a post-arraignment confession of another conspirator was admitted. The names of the non-confessors
had been left blank, and the trial court warned the jury fifteen
times that the confession was admissible only against the confessor.
On appeal, the main issue considered by the Court was whether
the presumption that a jury follows instructions was rebuttable.
The majority found that Delli Paoli had impliedly recognized an
exception to the presumption even where clear instructions to the
jury were present. The majority emphasized the dual aspect of
the Dell Paoli rule: not only must there be sufficiently clear
instructions to the jury, as were certainly given by the trial court
in the instant case, but there must be a reasonable possibility of
the jury following the instructions. With respect to the latter
requirement, the Court saw significant distinctions between the
facts of Delli Paoli and those of the instant case.
In Delli Paoli, the jury was presumed to have followed the
instructions because the conspiracy was simple and the part each
defendant played was clear. In Bozza, however, the Court noted
that three conspiracies, not one, were alleged, and the role of each
defendant was not easy to ascertain since ten different counts were
sent to the jury. In Delli Paoli, a separate trial was never requested,
while in the instant case the motion for severance was made many
times. The confession in Delli Paoli was found to have merely
corroborated what the government had already established, while in
Bozza the confession provided "devastating corroboration" of the
contested testimony of the former accomplice-informer.44 Finally,
in Dell Paoli, a presumption of obedience on the part of the jury
was bolstered by the absence of any evidence of jury confusion
or failure to follow the instructions. Here, notice was taken of the
fact that the only evidence requested by the jury was the confession,
a request that seemed unnecessary if they were merely deciding the
guilt of the confessor. Thus, in the Court's opinion, there was a
of [the jury] . . . 'failed to
"real doubt . . . that at least some
5
follow the court's instructions.""
In holding that the introduction of the confession was prejudicial to the non-confessing defendants, the Court distinguished prior
decisions rendered in the second circuit. It found that the peculiar
circumstances of the instant case necessitated this determination.

44
45

Id. at 216.
Ibd.
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The majority reasoned that:
it is not enough 'that the jury would have in all probability returned
a verdict of guilty' against the other defendants without knowledge of
[the confession] . . . which they were forbidden to possess

.

.

. The

test is whether belief 'is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or
had but very slight effect' . . . even if that be the standard in an area

with 'grave constitutional overtones.'

46

The instant case, however, does not completely reject the concept that protection is' afforded a codefendanf by a. trial court's
instruction limiting the applicability of an incriminating confession.
It is the Court's contention that there is a point at which the
presumptive effectiveness of such instructions becomes overstrained
and thus creates a basis for reversal.4 7 Even if the informer's
testimony were to be regarded as absolutely true,, the ,question of
error centers on a certainty that the jury would not have .been
influenced by the admission of the confession, and not ,on the
weight of the other evidence.
The dissent viewed- the majority opinion as endangering the
effectiveness of all future joint trials since it would "change the
law as to the, trial court's discretion and cast more than serious
doubt on the value of a judge's instructions.1 48

In addition, it was

felt that, as a result of the majority's decision, any confession in a
49
multiple-defendant trial becomes inadmissible.
While the immediate effect of this decision will be felt in the
second circuit, its ramifications apparently will be widespread since
many constitutional questions appear to be raised. In superimposing the mandate of Jackson v. Denno on .the rationale in-Bozza, it
seems clear that in addition to the procedures heretofore employed
in protecting a non-confessing defendant from implied, guilt,- the
trial court cannot rely solely ofi the jury's ability to compartmentalize the evidence. The mere 1iossibility that the jury is unable to
perform this function would apparently result in the non confessing
defendant being' denied a fair trial,. This line. of reas6hing may
be evidenced in the state courts in view "of the decigiofis"of People
46 Id. at 218. It should be noted that the court does not impose an
affirmative duty on the trial court to move for severance sua sponte when
an incriminating confession is introduced.
47
Id. at 217.
..
48 Id. at 231 (dissenting opinion).
49 Ibid.
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v, LaBelle5 and People v. Aranda 1 In those cases both courts
agreed that "unless 'all parts of the extrajudicial statements implicating any codefendants can be and are deleted without prejudice to
the declarant' they are inadmissible in a joint trial."-5 2 These cases
manifest a strong inclination to protect a defendant at a joint trial
from any possible adverse effect that a codefendant's confession
might have.
In addition, it is also possible that if an incriminating confession were admitted, even though the name of the non-confessing
defendant was deleted, and employed by a jury against such defendanti there might be an abridgement of the rights guaranteed by
the sixth amendment. Since it is clear that a defendant has the
right to confront his accuser and to cross-examine him, a question
may arise if the jury subconsciously substitutes the name of the
non-confessing defendant in the blank spaces of the confession. It
is conceivable that this could occur despite clear instructions by the
his right to
trial court, and thus, the defendant would be denied
3
cross-examine or confront the confessing defendant.
On the other hand, the dissent's view that the decision in the
instant case will have an adverse effect on future multi-defendant
trials presents a rational basis for argument. It was noted that the
alternative to the admission of this type of confession at a joint
trial would be a host of separate trials. In the instant case, for
example, the dissent postulates that thirty-six separate trials would
be required.5 4 Undoubtedly, this would place a severe strain on
the ability of the already overcrowded courts to grant a speedy trial.
s018 N.Y.2d 405,

-

N.E2d

-,

276 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1966).

defendants were jointly indicted and tried for murder.

Two

Subsequently, one of

the defendants gave a confession which incriminated his codefendant and

moved for severance. The trial court denied the motion and attempted to
protect the non-confessing defendant by deleting all references to him in the
confession. However, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court had
also deleted statements which tended to. inculpate the confessor. Thus, in
view of the inculpatory nature of the confession the "defendant's right to a
Id. at
fair trial could only be protected by means of a separate trial...."

411, -

N.E.2d at - , 276 N.Y.S.2d at 110.
2d 518, 407 P.2d 265, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1965).

Defendants
were convicted of first-degree robbery. The Supreme Court of California
held that the" admission of one defendants illegally obtained confession was
a miscarriage of justice against his codefendant notwithstanding the instruction to the jury that the confession was admissible only against the con5l 63 Cal.

fessor.
52 People v. LaBelle, 18 N.Y.2d 405, 411,
105, 110, (1966).
N.Y.S.2d
5

-

N.E2d

,

, 276

3 Another possibility whereby a defendant's right to cross-examine his

is where the confessing defendant refuses to take the witness
gccuser rises
,
stand.
V'Uidited States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206, 231 (2d Cir.' 1966) (dissenting
opinon)...
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Furthermore, the Court's broad acceptance of the "certainty of no
influence" test regarding harmless error creates the probability that
its rationale will be used outside the area of incriminating confessions, since the application of the harmless error statute is, thus,
limited to trivial errors in the admission of evidence, without
regard to the other evidence in the case.
Reversal in the instant case, of course, precludes review and
there is no easy prognosis as to future Supreme Court declarations
in this frequently appealed, factually distinguishable area. It would
appear that the difficulty of proof of conspiracy counts puts a
premimn on the use of a legally obtained confession in a government case. This might influence the Court to retain the admissibility of codefendant's confessions in as many factual situations
as possible, e.g., where there is no prejudice to the non-confessing
defendants because of the overwhelming substantial evidence
against them and where the jury has shown no reliance on the
confession. Because of the narrow majority margin in Jackson,
wherein the Delli Paoli rationale was criticized, there is little concrete indicia as to the life expectancy of the Delli Paoli rule. It is
suggested, nevertheless, that the instant decision shows a definite
resolve on the part of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to keep
its own courts in order even without Supreme Court directive, and
to use judicial initiative to give every defendant a completely fair
trial.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IMPRISONMENT RESULTING IN MORE
THAN ONE YEAR'S CONFINEMENT FOR A MISDEMEANOR DUn TO

INDIGENT DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO PAY A FINE: DEEMED UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND CONTRARY TO THE INTENT OF THE NEW
YORK STATUTE.Appellant, an indigent, pleaded guilty to a mis-

demeanor. The trial court, with full knowledge of appellant's
financial condition, sentenced him to one year's imprisonment and
fined him $500 with a provision that the fine, if not paid, be served
out at the rate of one day's imprisonment for each dollar unpaid.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed and held that when
the trial court is cognizant of an individual's inability to pay
a fine, subsequent imprisonment in lieu of the fine resulting in
imprisonment for more than the permissible maximum sentence,
is contrary to the intent of the New York Code of Criminal
Procedure. Such imprisonment violates the defendant's right to
equal protection of the law, and is proscribed by the eighth amendment to the federal constitution as an excessive fine. People v.
Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 218 N.E.2d 686, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1966).

